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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
r

This action was brought requesting declaration of

invalidity and unenforceability of a document entitled
"Agreement to Sell Cattle arid Lease Land With Option to
Purchase11 and for damages.

.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court found the document to be a valid
and enforceable agreement and held that Appellant had no
cause of action.

The court also supplied a description

of lands which it found to be covered by the document in
dispute and held that Respondents are entitled to specific
performance of the agreement it found to exist.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have this court reverse the Judgment and Decree of the trial court and hold that the document entitled "Agreement to Sell Cattle and Lease Land
With Option to Purchase" is invalid and unenforceable.,,,

,. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, Lowell L. Brady, is a 75-year old man who
-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

has owned and operated various properties with livestock
operations near Rangely, Colorado, since the 1920!s. (TR.
33). '

-

.;>,, ;,,

These properties are designated in purple on the map
at Page 3 of this brief and are referred to in this brief,
as they were by both Mr. Brady and Mr. Fausett in their
testimony at trial, by the names of the separate ranches.
(TR. 32, 33)

Two of the ranches had passed out of Mr.

Brady1s control at the time of the July 25, 1972 document
which is of concern in this case.

One of these two ranches

is referred to by Mr. Fausett (TR. 8) as a big ranch and
good cattle ranch which Mr. Fausett purchased from Mr.
Brady in April of 1972 consisting of 1,720 acres and B.L.M.
grazing permits.

(TR. 8, 32, 33 & 91)

Another had been

sold to Mr. Brady's son, Douglas Brady. (TR. 134)

In

addition to these two ranches, Mr. Brady had acquired
from time to time properties operated as separate ranches
by previous owners, and he as well as Respondents and
others continued to call these ranches by the names of previous owners; -i.e., N-Bar (TR. 293 & 321), Williams, (TR.

-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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32 & 259), Milner (TR. 32), Gomez (TR. 32), McNeil

(TR.

32, 214), Gross (TR. 32), Morgan Place (TR. 32, 241),
Ralph Rasmussen (TR. 32), Pete Atencio (TR. 32), John W.
Rasmussen (TR. 32), Daisey Kirk Place or Homestead (TR.
131, 224, 293, 295, & 305).

One of the separate ranches

is referred to in Paragraph 3 of the "Agreement to Sell
Cattle and Lease Land With Option to Purchase".

The cat-

tle were to be delivered to "Seller's Homestead Ranch (the
Daisy Kirk Place)11.

(Exhibit 4)

As indicated on the map, which is a copy of the map
used and referred to at the trial (TR. 31 & 32), the lands
involved are non-continguous parcels separated from each
other in some cases by many miles, and they are interspersed among lands owned by .others.

Three of the separ-

ate properties are located in Garfield County, Colorado,
and the remainder in Rio Blanco County, Colorado.

Some

of the lands were mortgaged to the Connecticut General
Life Insurance Company and others were not. (TR. 128) Some
of the lands were used as base lands to maintain U. S.
Bureau of Land Management Grazing privileges.

Others had

no grazing privileges attached to them and were operated
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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separate from any connection to B.L.M. lands.

(TR. 109)

In addition, Mr. Brady operated a ranch in the same general area in the 1920!s before he acquired most of the
lands which he now owns and acquired after 1942 (TR. 33).
Mr. Brady is the father of four sons and two daughters.

(TR. 31)

In March or April of 1972, Mr. Brady be-

came acquainted with Respondent, John E. Fausett, and an
unusually close relationship developed between the two
men.

(TR. 7, 9, 36) Mr. Brady's wife of fifty years was

being cared for in a convalescent home at Roosevelt, Utah,
near Mr. Fausett!s home. Mrs. Brady had suffered from
serious illness, including a stroke, since 1965.

(TR. 9,

36, 37, 38, 39 & 40) Mrs. Brady had been in Roosevelt for
over a year, having been moved there after being kept at
the Utah State Hospital in Provo, Utah, as well as in Las
Vegas, Nevada, and in Manti, Utah.

(TR. 37, 38, 39 & 40)

During the time Mrs. Brady was in Roosevelt, Mr. Brady
commuted back and forth between his cattle operation in
Colorado and the Roosevelt convalescent home almost daily,
attempting to be with his wife as much as possible yet

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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still hold onto the ranching operation into which he had
put his entire life.

(TR. 9 & 41)

Mr. Brady, during this same period of time, experienced a falling out with two of his sons who had previously worked with him in his livestock operation, and
they now refused to lend a hand.

(TR. 11, 41 & 42) Fi-

nancially, Mr. Brady was in trouble and faced the prospect
of losing his entire operation.

(TR. 152)

Under the

pressure of these events, Mr. Brady himself became physically ill, and mentally and physically exhausted, and
he realized he could no longer carry on.

(TR. 26, 42, 43,

48, 53, 79, 80, 205, 208, 209 & 214)
Mr. Brady stayed nights and was taken care of at the
Fausett. home over a period of many weeks during the last
of Mrs. Brady's illness before she died in June of 1972.
(TR^9, 46) Mr. Brady came to confide in Mr. Fausett and
trust him with him problems (TR. 47 & 48) and his financial circumstances.

(TR. 260) Mr. Fausett realized that

Mr. Brady had placed his trust in him (TR. 267) and told
other people about it.

(TR. 10, 264, 267, 268) As Mr.

-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Fausett learned that Mr. Brady was incapable of managing
his business and saw Mr. Brady so sick he couldn!t work
(TR. 53), he took a hand in Mr. Brady1s affairs. Mr. Fausett worked with Mr. Brady's cattle, bought Mr. Brady a
new pickup truck, (TR. 12, 23, 24, 50, 51 & 52) and generally concerned himself with Mr. Brady's interests.
As Mr. Brady's financial circumstances grew more serious, he asked Mr. Fausett to help him by managing or leas
ing his lands until he could get back on his feet mentally
and health-wise. Mr. Fausett testified at the trial:
"I told him at that time I was not interested in the property because I did not
feel that it was fair to him, or me or anyone else to take the place at this time."
(Emphasis supplied)
(TR. 26) Mr. Fausett understood the pressures under which
Mr. Brady was laboring and admitted in the quoted sentence that Mr. Brady was in no condition to deal on a
major transaction.

Mr. Fausett reported to Lois Adams,

Mr. Brady's daughter, at a later time that he:
"didn't see how . . . (Mr. Brady) . . .
had been able to keep from having a mental
breakdown,- that he had spent fifty to sixty nights in his home the previous ten
months, and that Mrs. Fausett had cared for
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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him as he was very ill, and . . . that when
he was trying to get together the cattle that
Spring, he was trying to gather them by himself. And John told me that he saw my father
going along with a string of cans shaking them
behind the cattle trying to get at these cattle
alone, and then he would stop and break down
and cry, and then he would pick up a stick and
go along, and try to gather cattle without any
other help.11 (TR. 214)
Mr. Brady asked Mr. Fausett to help him arrange a
loan to meet his financial obligations until he could
get back on his feet and fend for himself.

(TR. 50 &

266) Mr. Fausett contacted Respondent, George L. Smith,
and Smith and Fausett looked over the Brady operation and
various properties. When Respondents realized that Mr.
Brady was in no condition physically or mentally to continue to operate his properties, they decided rather than
offer financial help by way of a loan, they would attempt
to acquire the properties.

(TR. 55 & 58)

Mr. Brady told them he was in no condition to talk
that kind of business (TR. 56) and let them know that in
any event he would never sell the Milner Place.

The Mil-

ner Place was special in that it had been purchased by

-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mr. Brady from the original patentee, and it was there
that a cabin had been built where the Brady family had
lived when the children were growing up.

These lands

had great sentimental value to Mr. Brady, especially at
that time near his wifefs death.

He had communicated

this feeling to Respondents and told them he had two
daughters to whom he had promised these lands.
35, 57 & 58)

(TR. 34,

On the occasion when Respondents Smith and

Fausett were shown this place in early July of 1972, Mr.
Brady broke down when he told them about his feelings
concerning it. Mr. Smith said:
sell that place."

(TR. 57 6c 58)

"I don't intent to."

"Mr. Brady, don't never
and Mr. Brady answered:

There was never any question that

Mr. Brady did not intend to part with the Milner Place
under any circumstances.
When Mr. Fausett learned that Mr. Smith would join
him and back him financially if he could get Mr. Brady
to turn the operation over, he began anxiously to pursue
the matter.

He proposed that Mr. Brady sell to himself

and Mr. Smith an interest in his operation (TR. 184) which
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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was rejected.

Later he proposed a joint project which

would guarantee Mr. Brady $47,000.00 a year profit.

(TR.

58 & 255) Mr. Brady also rejected that proposal, but
suggested a sale of his cattle and a ten-year lease on
the land at a rental of $25,000.00 per year. With the
sale of the cattle and the earlier sale of lands to Mr.
Fausett, Mr. Brady felt he would have his financial obligations taken care of, an income of $25,000.00 a year,
and freedom from the responsibility of operating the ranch.
This arrangement was agreed upon.

(TR. 58, 59, 137, 138,

255 & 256)
During the latter part of July, Brady, Fausett and
Smith met at the office of Hugh W. Colton, an attorney in
Vernal, Utah.

The purpose of the meeting at Mr. Colton1s

office was to prepare an agreement regarding the sale of
Mr. Brady!s cattle and a ten-year lease of his lands.
(TR. 69)

The annual rental of $25,000.00 was agreed upon

prior to the meeting.

(TR. 68, 69)

When Mr. Brady arrived at Mr. Colton1s office, Mr.
Fausett and Mr.„ Smith were already there. A discussion,

-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and later an argument and disagreement ensued wherein Mr.
Colton, Mr. Fausett and Mr. Smith attempted to persuade
Mr. Brady to sell, not just lease his lands.

(TR. 69 6c

70) Mr. Brady insisted he did'not want to sell.
& 70)

(TR. 69

In addition, he argued that even if he were to sell,

some of the lands had to be reserved for his two daughters.
Both Mr. Colton and Mr. Brady referred to the disagreement
when they testified at trial.

(TR. 70, 242) Although Mr.

Colton was in theory Mr. Brady1s attorney, he urged Mr.
Brady to sell and took an active part in attempting to
set a price on the lands, contrary to Mr. Brady1s wishes.
(TR. 69, 88 & 89)

Because the argument caused Mr. Brady

great distress from a severe prostate problem, he was
forced to leave the office for some time to visit the
rest room.

(TR. 70)

When Mr. Brady returned, he was told that Mr. Colton, Mr. Fausett and Mr. Smith had gone to a nearby restaurant and that he was to go there to meet them.
70)

(TR. -

The parties talked further and when they returned

to Mr. Colton1s office, Mr. Brady was presented with an

-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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already typed document entitled MAgreement to Sell Cattle
and Lease Lands With Option to Purchase.?

(Exhibit 4)

This document set forth the agreement of the parties regarding the sale to Fausett and Smith of Mr. Brady's cattle.

It also contained provision for a lease of lands f

with an annual rental of $25,000.00;

the term of the

lease, however, was for five (5) years rather than the
previously agreed upon term of ten (10) years.

In add-

ition, the document provided for an option to purchase
lands which Mr. Brady insisted should not be included.
Mr. Brady knew that without a sale of his cattle he
would probably lose his holdings to his creditors. Respondents, however, had given him a choice of accepting the entire transaction on their terms in effect, or losing the
property to the bank.

This, of course, including the op-

tion to purchase, after Mr. Brady had taken Mr. Fausett
into his confidence and revealed his personal affairs to
him, and after Mr. Fausett had led Mr. Brady to rely on
receiving payment for his cattle to extract himself from
his financial 'difficulties.

Now he had to either accept

-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the deal on Respondents1 terms or he would get no money.
The document entitled "Agreement to Sell Cattle and
Lease Land With Option to Purchase1' was prepared with
such haste that when it was submitted to Mr. Brady it was
incomplete in that it had no description of the properties
to be included.

The document recites as follows:

"Seller agrees to and hereby leases to
Buyers the following described real property
situated in Rio Blanco and Garfield Counties,
Colorado, for a period of five (5) years, at
an annual rental of $25,000.00 per year. The
year's rental to be paid on or before January
2, 1973, and on January 2 of every year thereafter during the five-year term of this lease.
The said land leased herein is described as
follows:11 (Exhibit 4, Paragraph 7 )
The document then states:
here)11

(Exhibit 4)

"(Description will be placed

in the center of the page.

No pro-

perty description was placed in the document at that time
as there had been no agreement reached as to which lands
were to be included or excluded.

The transcript shows

without contradiction that Mr. Brady insisted on withholding lands and would not agree otherwise (TR. 88 & 89),
and that Mr. Smith would not agree to that.

(TR. 242)

No agreement was ever reached on that point and thus no

-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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description was placed in the contract.

If it had been

otherwise, a reference to all property could easily have
been made. Mr. Brady had maintained that he did not want
to sell at all, and at the vdry least that he had to hold
certain lands for his daughters. Mr. Brady's objection
to the sale of all lands was stated unequivocally and without contradiction at the time the document was discussed
at Mr. Colton's office. At the trial, Mr. Brady said:
"A: Right while I was in Mr. Colton's
office I said, 'Hugh, Ifm terribly bugged about
this thing1."
"Q:

What did you mean, 'bugged1?11

fI

A: Well, I was all shook up. I told him
I says 'This isn't the way we started out with
this deal, because it had been changed to a
five-year lease and there had . . . there was an
option here.' And he said, 'Forget it'. He
said, 'You'll never be able to . . . You've
got all the money that you need.' And I said,
'Hugh, there's a sentimental reason here that
you're over-looking'."
At the time Mr. Brady placed his signature on the agreement without any property description to get the cattle sold, he said:
"A: *I told Mr. Colton, I said, 'There are

-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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lands here that I'm turning to my daughters1.
I have daughters that I told them that I
would keep the Milner Place (the) the Williams
Place for my family. And he said 'Mr. Brady1,
he said, 'I've seen so much of that over in
Dry Fork, right over here, (indicating) I've
handled many cases, and1 he said, 'let it all
go.1 And I said, 'No, Mr. Colton. I can't
do it because I promised my family that I
would keep part of these lands.11'
(TR. 88 & 89)
Mr. Fausett also testified concerning a discussion
in Mr. Colton's office at which Mr. Brady said, "I would
like to keep the little area that I have fenced around
the Milner Cabin".

(TR. 15)

The transaction was so hurried and entered into under
such pressure, Mr. Brady being in a state of opposition,
confusion and exhaustion, that no attempt was even made
to specifically describe what was to be included.

(TR.

71)
Mr. Brady took a copy of the document with him and
left.

He had confided in Mr. Fausett as a father would

in a son, and had counted on the sale of cattle to clear
up his financial obligations.

Now, because Respondents

had been taken into Mr. Brady's confidence, he was put
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into a position of either entering into a transaction
which he knew he wasn't ready to handle and did not want
anything to do with or lose the sale of cattle he had
counted on to extract himself from his financial difficulties.

Mr. Brady went to Colorado

(TR. 74) where Mr.

Fausett continued to pressure him to go through with the
deal.

When Mr. Brady told Mr. Fausett he was sick and

wanted to be left alone, Mr. Fausett expressed concern
that Mr. Brady would die before the papers were signed
and offered to take him to a doctor in Salt Lake City
(TR. 79 & 82) after the papers were signed.
Mr. Brady discussed the matter with the Colorado P.
C.A. officials (TR. 75) and one of his sons and told the
son that he had no intentions of signing the contract (TR.
176) -;
' " The P.C.A. officials told him the document was poorly
prepared and that he didn't have to sign it if he didn't
want to (TR. 76). He promised one of his daughters he
wouldn't sign any papers until he had talked to her. (TR.
209, 210)
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Mr. Brady, as soon as he was able, returned to Utah
to tell Mr. Fausett.

(TR. 80) Mr. Brady and Mr. Fausett

met and argued late into the night.

(TR. 80 & 81) Mr.

Fausett took the approach of threatening to pull out of
the deal entirely and in fact turning back to Mr. Brady
the ranch which he had previously purchased from Mr. Brady.

(TR. 261 & 262)

Because of his close relationship

with Mr. Brady and the confidence from which he benefited,
Mr. Fausett knew well that Mr. Brady, at that time, was
in no condition to handle his cattle by himself and desperately needed to get the money from their sale and the
earlier ranch sale to Mr. Fausett.

(TR. 262)

The next morning, Mr. Brady being very ill and exhausted, was driven by Mr. Fausett to Vernal where Mr.
Brady placed his signature on the document without discussing it with any member of his family despite his prior
practice and promise of doing so.

(TR. 187, 188, 197,

209, 210) Mr. Brady again expressed his refusal to include the.Milner and Williams1 Places. Mr. Colton told
him that he would have to come back and finish up the contract by inserting the property descriptions of the lands
-17Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to be included since he was the only one who knew what
lands were to go into the agreement, but that the incomplete agreement would do for now. Mr. Brady is still confused and does not know for sure what happened that he put
his signature on an agreement without any property description.

(TR. 71, 128) He said at the trial:
l!

I don't hesitate in making a statement
that I was so rum-dum after the condition which
I had gone through that I didn't . . . I've
never figured out yet hardly what happened from
then on. I never figured out how come that I
would sign an agreement of that kind.11
(TR. 71)
Mr. Fausett then drove Mr. Brady, still very ill, to the
Vernal Airport from where he flew to Las Vegas, Nevada.
Mr. Brady was confined in bed at the home of his daughter
for approximately forty days.

(TR. 84, 85, 210)

His son-

-in-law described his condition at the time as being completely shell-shocked and mentally incapable of making
any decisions.

(TR. 220)

During this time, Mr. Fausett

took possession of the Brady properties and cattle as he
was to care for and manage the cattle until time to count
and ship them.
In October of 1972, while Mr. Brady was still sick
-18Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Respondent Fausett secured from Hugh Colton a copy of the
document entitled "Agreement to Sell Cattle and Lease Lands
With Option to Purchase11 and took it without Mr. Brady!s
consent or knowledge (TR. 295, 318, 319) to the Meeker,
Colorado Office of the Bureau of Land Management and requested that all of Mr. Brady's B.L.M. grazing privileges be
transferred to Mr. Fausett and Mr. Smith.
106 & 165)

(TR. 16, 17,

When the B.L.M. observed that the document

was incomplete and that it did not contain any property
description, they required Mr. Fausett to furnish a document with the property description before any grazing
privilege could be transferred.

A description of some

lands was secured, taped to a copy of the document entitled "Agreement to Sell Cattle and Lease Lands With
Option to Purchase11, and filed with the B.L.M.
12)

(Exhibit

The description of the properties inserted in the

document described some lands which were not even owned
by Mr. Brady, yet failed to describe other lands which
were.

On the basis of this document, the Bureau of Land

Management transferred to Fausett and Smith all of Lowell
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Brady's grazing privileges with the B.L..M., consisting of
some 60,000 acres of land.

This action effectively de-

prived Mr. Brady of any opportunity to require Fausett
and Smith to sit down and finalize the agreement.
When Mr. Brady determined what had occurred, he formally protested the transfer of Grazing Privileges by the
B.L.M., which protest is now pending in the Department of
the Interior.
All during the Winter of 1972 and Spring of 1973, Mr.
Brady attempted to get an accounting from Mr. Fausett as
to the number of cattle Mr. Fausett claimed to have received (TRv< 86 & 87) and to follow up on what Mr. Brady
considered the unfinished bttsiriess of completing the transaction by reaching an agreement on which lands were to be
included.

(TR. 106, 107, 108, 109 & 115, and Exhibits L6

and 17)
As Mr. Brady recuperated from his illness in the Spring
of 1973 and his attempts to talk with Mr. Fausett to. clear
up what he considered to be the unfinished business of finalizing the incompleted transaction brought no results, in
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the early Summer of 1973, Mr. Smith and Mr. Fausett were
given written notice that Mr. Brady did not consider himself bound by the agreement, and eventually a notice to
quit was served on Fausett and Smith and the instant action was filed to have the incomplete document declared
invalid.

(TR. 115 and Exhibits 16 & 17)

ARGUMENT
I.
IN EQUITY CASES THE APPEAL MAY BE ON QUESTIONS OF BOTH
LAW AND FACT.
Article VIII, Section 9, of the Constitution of the
State of Utah, relates to appeals from District Courts
and provides in pertinent part as follows:
"In equity cases the appeal may be on
questions of both law and fact; . . ."
The case before the Court being a case in equity (TR.
1 & 2) involving questions of right to specific performance
under an asserted contract, the Supreme Court has the responsibility to review the evidence.

Nokes v. Continen-

tal Min. & Mill Co., 6 Utah 2d. 177, 308 P.2d 954 (1957).
In fact it is the duty of the Supreme Court under Section
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9 of Article VIII of the Constitution of Utah to review
the facts, make an independent analysis of them, and determine what findings and conclusions can be properly
drawn from the evidence.

Crockett v. Nish, 106 Utah 241,

147 P.2d 853 (1944).

II.
THE DOCUMENT ENTITLED "AGREEMENT TO SELL CATTLE AND LEASE
LAND WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE" WHICH DOES NOT DESCRIBE THE
LANDS TO BE INVOLED BUT STATES THAT A DESCRIPTION WILL BE
INSERTED LATER IS UNENFORCEABLE.
The Agreement before the Court is unenforceable because it does not meet the requirements of the Statute of
Frauds.

Furthermore, to supply a property description

which the parties themselves did not agree upon would violate the parol evidence rule.

Davison v. Robbins, 30

Utah 2d., 388, 517 P.2d 1026 (1973).

There appears to be

no conflict in the rule that blank deeds or blank papers
executed as was the "Agreement to Sell Cattle and Lease
Land With Option to Purchase" are void and do not convey
any interest in or title to land.

Utah State Building &

Loan Ass'n. v.-Perkins, Et;Al., 53 Utah 474, 173 P. 950
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(1918).

A long line of cases establishes that in order

to comply with the Statute of Frauds, a contract or deed
for the conveyance of land must contain a description of
the land sufficiently definite to locate it without recourse to oral testimony.
(Wash. 1943);

Barth v. Barth, 143 P.2d 542

Martinsen v. Cruikshank, 3 Wash. 2d. 565,

101 P.2d 604 (1940).

Papers executed in blank as to the

description of the property intended to be conveyed are
a nullity.

Utah State Building and Loan Ass!n. v. Per-

kins, Et. Al., 53 Utah 474, 173 P. 950 (1918);

Mesich

v. Board of County Commissioners of McKinley County, 129
P.2d 974 (N.M. 1942);

Dahlberg v. Johnson1s Estate, 211

P.2d 764 (Ida. 1949).
This Court recently stated in the case of Davison v.
Robbins the rule which is applicable in the instant case.
"Parol evidence will not be admitted to
complete a defective description, or to show
the intention with which it was made. Parol
evidence way be used for the purpose of identifying the description contained in the writing with it's location upon the ground, but
not for the purpose of ascertaining and locating the land about which the parties negotiated, and supplying a description thereof
which they have omitted from the writing.; "
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There is a clear distinction between the
admission of oral and extrinsic evidence
for the purpose of identifying the land
described and applying the description to
the property and that of supplying and
adding to a description insufficient and
void on its fact.11
Davison v. Robbins, 30 Utah 2d. 338, 517
P.2d 1026, (1973) at 342.
The context in which the instant case came before
the Court is a request for a declaration as to whether
or not specific performance of the contract would be ordered.

It is elementary that the law will not enforce

specific performance of a contract unless the contract
is definite, certain and complete.

Equity cannot make a

contract for the parties when they themselves have not agreed upon its terms. Allen v. Kitchen, 16 Ida. 133, 100
P. 1052 (1909);

Brooks v. Allard, 244 C.A. 2d 283, 53

Cal.Rptr. 82 (1966);

Corona Unified School District of

Riverside County v. Velar, 165 C.A. 2d. 561, 332 P.2d
294 (1959);
21 (1961);

Herrmann v. Hodin, 58 Wash. 2d. 441 364 P.2d
Meadowlark Investment Corp. v. Croeni, 237

Ore. 535, 392 P.2d 327 (1964).

In the instant case, any

evidence introduced by Defendants would not be that of
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identification of a description good on its face;

rather

it would be for the purpose of supplying a description omitted originally from an incomplete and indefinite contract and is therefore inadmissable for the purpose of supplying that to the contract.
Mr. Brady has contended that the parties never agreed
on what lands were to be placed in the incomplete document
entitled "Agreement to Sell Cattle and Lease Land With Option to Purchase11.

That this is so is evidenced by the

fact that Defendants themselves have claimed in four separate instances that the document should have included at
least four different property descriptions.

First, Respon-

dents took the position at trial that all of the lands
owned by Lowell Brady in the State of Colorado were a part
of the transaction.

Notwithstanding that assertion, the

Respondents supplied the Bureau of Land Management a copy
of the document entitled

!f

Agreement to Sell Cattle and

Lease Land With Option to Purchase11 (TR. 165) containing
a description of properties which not only included lands
not owned by Mr. Brady, but also did not include lands
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which actually were owned by him.

Even at the time of

trial, Respondent Fausett remained under the misconception that all.lands owned by Lowell Brady were tied up
with the B.L.M. as base land.

This was not true, how-

ever, as the entire 440-acre N-Bar Ranch was not used as
B.L.M. base land.

The reason for this misconception on

the part of Respondent stems from the fact that he and Mr.
Brady never discussed selling all of the properties owned
by Mr. Brady, and when Mr. Fausett found descriptions for
approximately 2,120 acres, he figured he had all Mr. Brady owned.
Third, Fausett and Smith were obligated under the agreement to pay all of the real estate taxes on the lands
involved in the contract. (Exhibit 4, Paragraph 8) The
Respondents for two years after 1972 did not pay taxes on
the Williams and Milner Places, the lands which Mr. Brady
had insisted on keeping.

Mr. Brady paid those taxes both

years and has done so since that time, which was in accordance with his understanding that those lands were retained
by him.

Interestingly, Fausett claimed at trial that he

paid taxes on all the property he bought from Mr. Brady,
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(TR. 28) yet the exhibits show without dispute that Mr.
Bradyt not Fausett, paid those Garfield County taxes for
1972, 1973 & 1974, following the contract;

also that Mr.

Brady paid all taxes on all lands for 1973 & 1974.

(TR.

103, 104, 159, 160, 290 and Exhibit 14)
Respondents1 failure to pay taxes on those particular lands support Mr. Brady1s position that those lands
w^re never to have been included in the agreement.
;. Fourth, Respondents have asserted that they purchased
2,120 acres from Appellant.

(TR. 27)

Even under oath

while answering interrogatories with the help of their
attorneys, Respondents claimed to have purchased 2,120
acres.

At trial, Respondents1 counsel persisted in using

the 2,120 acre figure.

(TR. 139)

owned 12,560 acres in Colorado.

The Appellant actually

If Defendants1 statement

is true, they therefore did not purchase 440 acres which
Appellant would, of course, therefore retain.

This is

consistent with what Appellant has claimed from the beginning.

He would voluntarily consider 2,120 acres as

being the agreement, thus leaving him the approximately
400 acres which he desired to retain.

Respondents, how-
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ever, took the self-contradicting position that they were
to have all of Mr. Brady's lands, but only 2,120 acres of
them.

There could be no clearer evidence to support the

Plaintiff1 s position that no agreement was actually reached.

The different positions taken by the Respondents are

so inconsistent that it is clear that they themselves have
not come to any agreement as to what was to be involved.
The trial court in its Memorandum Decision dated March
24, 1975, based its conclusion that a valid contract had
been reached on two points, neither of which can be supported by the evidence.

First, the Court found that Plain-

tiff's lawyer, presumably Mr. Hugh Colton, who appeared as
a witness in the case against Mr. Brady (TR. 328) and was
never paid anything for the contract by Mr. Brady, (TR.
117) was given full authority from Plaintiff to ascertain
the correct legal descriptions of the properties to go into the agreement.
conclusion.

Nothing in the evidence supports that

To the contrary, all the evidence, including

the testimony of Mr. Fausett and Mr. Colton (TR. 243) was
that Mr. Brady was to furnish the descriptions.

(TR. 16)

He alone knew what he was going to include. Mr. Colton
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sent for some abstracts to only part of the property (TR.
128).

He told Lowell Brady he was the only one who knew

what was to go into the deal and encouraged him to come
finish it up.

(TR. 73, 119)

Even if he were acting pur-

suant to an authorization by Mr. Brady to include some
property descriptions, the fact remains undisputed that
he never did do that and has not done so even now, three
years later.

Obviously, he did not consider himself au-

thorized as the court found him to be.

The finding is

not supported by the record, and if it were, it would not
cure the Statute of Frauds defects since no description
was ever inserted.
The second point on which the Court relied in reaching
its conclusion that specific performance was appropriate
was that Respondents had partially performed, and that
Appellant had accepted benefits therefrom, which estopped
Appellant from asserting that the agreement was unenforceable.
Presumably the acts relied upon to cure the lack of
legal description in this case involved the taking of possession by Respondents. Mere possession alone is insuff-29Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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icient.

Van Trotha v. Bamberger, 15 Col. 1, 24 P. 883

(1890).

Moreover, the evidence clearly shows that Mr.

Brady did not really deliver possession in any true sense,
but that Respondents took possession from him during his
time of sickness. When Respondents took possession, it
was consistent with their purchase of the cattle.

It

might also be construed as consistent with a lease of
some lands, but is not persuasive in an argument regarding which lands were to be under any lease or option.
It is factually significant that the Respondent established a new camp.

Nothing in the evidence indicates

their use of the cabin on the Milner Place which Mr. Brady had insisted on keeping.

Neither did the Respondents

make any of their improvements on the Milner Place, the
Williams Place, or the Gomez Place, an indication of their
undertainty about which lands were to be retained by the
Appellant.

In addition, it should be noted that the part

performance which Respondents claim by their establishing
of a trailer camp and new corrals is in reality nothing
more than work which needed to be done in any event for
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the purpose of facilitating the rounding up of the cattle
which they had previously agreed to purchase from Mr. Brady.
The terms of the document of July 25th and the addendum clearly indicate that the monies paid Mr. Brady in July and October of 1972 were for the payment of cattle and
had nothing whatsoever to do with any payment on lands.
(TR. 121, 124 & 125)

Likewise, the money which was sent

to Mr. Brady at the beginning of each year, and which each
time Respondents refused to take back when Mr. Brady attempted to return the money to them (TR. 159) , can only be construed as fair compensation to Mr. Brady for the use Respondents have had of his property.

Each such check or

draft has itself had noted thereon by Respondents themselves the words "rental" or "lease payment".

(TR. 125,

126 & 127) Appellant indicated that he is holding any

f

pre-payment of rent and stands ready to return it to Respondents upon their delivery to him of possession of his
property.

Respondents were aware that Mr. Brady did not
•

•

*

•

•

.

'

•

•

•

•

consider the sale of land closed as evidenced by their
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efforts to get him to take some money on the land as early as October of 1972.

(TR. 226)

Specific performance will Daly be decreed when the
party asking it will be defrauded if it is not granted.
Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Company, 6 Utah 2d. 18 305
P.2d 480 (1956).

Respondents have not alleged nor have

they proven any such kind of case.

The evidence is un-

contradicted that as soon as Mr. Brady was partially restored to health, he put Respondents on notice of his concerns regarding the transaction.

He contacted his attor-

ney, Mr. Chamberlain, in Richfield, Utah, in early 1973,
who in turn wrote Mr. Fausett. Mr. Brady went to the Meeker, Colorado, B.L.M. office and made his position known
to B.L.M. personnel and Mr. Fausett.

He and his son took

horses and attempted to inspect the Milner ranch he had
insisted he would never part with, but they were ordered
off the property.

(TR. 107)

In early 1973, after pre-

vious informal conversations with Mr. Fausett in which he
expressed his position, a formal notice to quit was served.
Mr. Brady took every reasonable step under the circumstances
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to put Defendants on notice of his position as soon as he
got out of his sick bed.

No fraud on his part has been

alleged nor proven.
Part performance as a doctrine may be used as a cure
to a defective description only under circumstances not
existing in this case.

Partial performance is not a cure

to the parol evidence rule problem with which the Supreme
Court of Utah was concerned in the case of Davison v. Robbins, 30 Utah 2d. 338, 517 P.2d 1026 (1973).

The case be-

fore the Court has both Statute of Frauds and parol evidence problems.

It is clear that the July 25th "Agree-

ment to Sell Cattle and Lease Land With Option to Purchase11
does not contain a sufficient description of property to
meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds.

The Re-

spondents, therefore, persuaded the trial court to employ
the doctrine of partial performance to cure the lack of
description.

The law without variation is that partial

performance will not be employed to require specific performance unless the contract is clear, definite, and certain.

Certainty and definiteness are not found in the in-
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stant case.

The parol evidence rule then comes into play.

Parol evidence is admissible to apply, but not to supply,
a description of lands in a contract.
30 Utah 2d. 338, 517 P.2d 1026 (1973).

Davison v. Robbins,
Partial perform-

ance, if it were shown, does not overcome the parol evidence problem found in this case.

Even more than in the

Davison case, there is a lack of certainty here.

The par-

ties left to a later time the determination and insertion
of a description of the exact lands to be involved.

The .

evidence of the case is uncontradicted that the withholding of some lands was discussed and no final agreement was
made.

Exhibit No. 5, Hugh Colton's letter to Fausett, in

its final paragraph clearly sets forth his understanding
that after the cattle sale was concluded, the parties
would have to meet and work out the description of the
lands to be involved.

;

The Statute of Frauds was enacted for the very purpose to which it should be applied here, that is to prevent parties from claiming that lands have been sold to
them when there is no written agreement to evidence the
same.
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Also, specific performance is a doctrine of equity.
Those who request it must come to court with clean hands.
Specific performance will not be decreed unless damages
would be inadequate.

Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Com-

pany, 6 Utah 2d. 18, 305 P.2d 480 (1956).

Without conce-

ding any damages to Respondents, it is respectfully sub-,
mitted that damages for any monies Respondents might prove
to have spent or which might benefit Mr. Brady upon his
regaining possession of his lands will be adequate.

The

counterclaim of Respondents evidences Respondents concurrence in the idea that they can be compensated with money
damages.
The Court should rule that the document before the
Court is unenforceable for the reason that it is incomplete, lacks a description of properties, and that there
was never an agreement between the parties as to which
lands were to be involved.

Certainly the Court cannot

determine the intention of the parties from the four corners of the instrument as required by the law. Furthermore, the evidence is persuasive that no enforceable a-
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greement was reached.
III.
THE OPTION TO PURCHASE LANDS IN THE WRITING OF JULY 25,
1972 IS UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE NO CONSIDERATION WAS GIVEN
FOR IT.
Prior to the meeting at Hugh Coltonfs office, Brady
and Fausett had agreed on a sale of cattle for which Mr.
Brady was to be paid, plus a ten (10) year lease with payments to Mr. Brady of $25,000.00 per year.

(TR. 58 & 59)

After the meeting, there was an agreement calling for the
sale of cattle and a 5-year rather than a 10-year lease,
with payments still at $25,000.00 per year and an option
to purchase.
the option.

(Exhibit 4)

No consideration was given for

In fact, Mr. Brady had less than before.

The

inescapable conclusion must be that there exists no valid
option for want of consideration.
An option is defined in a simple and elementary way .
as a binding promise to keep an offer open for a stated
period of time or until a specified date. O.A. 01in v. ,
>: Lambach, 35 Ida. 767, 209 P.277, 44 A.L.R. 354; Davenport v. Doyle Petroleum Corporation, 190 Okla. 548, 126
P.2d 54; Strong v. Moore, 105 Ore. 12, 207 P. 179, 23
A.L.R. 1217.
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It has long been established that the consideration
for an option to purchase land is a thing apart from the
consideration for the lease or of the actual sale of the
land.

There must be some consideration of which it can

be said "This was given by the proposed purchaser to the
proposed vendor as the price for the option for the privilege to purchase."
(1890).

Ide v. Leiser, 10 Mont. 5, 24 P. 695

The evidence clearly indicates that the rental

of $25,000.00 per year was arrived at through negotiations
between Mr. Brady and Mr. Fausett and was agreed upon before any discussion with regard to an option was held.
Also, the price of the cattle was specifically set forth.
Not one cent has been paid to Appellant for an option to
purchase lands.

No consideration having been given for

the option, it should be held invalid and unenforceable.

.iv.

:

"';-

* :"

THE COURT SHOULD SET ASIDE THE CONTRACT OF JULY 25, 1972
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF WAS INCAPABLE OF CONDUCTING BUSINESS
OF THE MAGNITUDE INVOLVED AT THE TIME HE SIGNED IT AND
DEFENDANTS ABUSED A RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST WHICH HAD BEEN
ESTABLISHED AND EXTRACTED A CONTRACT APPELLANT WOULD NOT
OTHERWISE HAVE* GIVEN.
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The fact that Mr. Brady was in very poor physical
health, was mentally exhausted^ confused and unstable is
virtually uncontested and in fact is confirmed by the testimony of Respondent, John Fausett.

(TR. 26, 42, 43, 48,

53, 79, 80, 205, 208, 209 & 214) Also uncontested is the
fact that a very close relationship was established between Mr. Brady and Mr. Fausett to the extent that Mr.
Brady placed his trust and confidence in Mr. Fausett in
his person&l and business problems.
47, 48, 264, 267 & 268)

(TR. 7, 9, 10, 36,

Indeed, Mr. Fausett went so far

as to say at trial that he had grown to love Mr. Brady.
(TR. 264) Whenever two persons stand in such relation
that confidence is necessarily reposed by one and the influence which naturally grows out of that confidence is
possessed by the other, and this confidence is abused or
the influence is exerted to obtain an advantage at the expense of the confiding party, the person so availing himself of this position will not be permitted to retain the
advantage, even if the transaction could not have been
impeached if nd confidential relationship had existed.
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The courts of equity have carefully refrained from
defining the particular instances of fiduciary relationships in such a manner that other and perhaps new cases
might be excluded.

It is settled by an overwhelming

weight of authority that the principle extends to every
possible case in which a fiduciary relationship exists
as a fact, in which there is confidence reposed on one
side and resulting superiority and influence on the other.
The relationship and the duties involved in it need not
be legal;

they may be moral, social, domestic, or merely

personal.

Bentley v. Bentley, 141 Md. 428, 119 A. 293.

When such a fiduciary relationship is established as in
this case, the burden of proof should be shifted to defendants to prove that the transaction was fair, just
and reasonable.

Hinshaw v. Hinshaw, 148 Colo. 262, 365

P.2d 815 (1961).

This contract should be set aside on

the basis of the inequality between the parties, where
there existed weakness on one side and advantage taken
of that weakness on the other.

Respondents, upon finding

Mr. Brady's weakness, utilized it to extract from him a
contract which he would not otherwise have made.
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In these

circumstances, the law presumes in favor of Mr. Brady and
against the Respondents that:
(1) The relationship placed the Respondents in
a position to exercise influence and dominion over Mr. Brady;
(2) That influence or dominion operated upon and
procured the transaction, and
(3) That the influence was improper and unfair
or, to use the accepted phrase, was an undue influence.
This transaction should not stand unless the Respondents
are able to repel the presumption by contrary evidence
proving that it was fair, just, and reasonable. Pittbrenner v. Myerson, 414 Colo. 448, 167 P.2d 15 (1946).
Whenever a person is in pecuniary necessity and distress so that he would be likely to make an undue sacrifice, and advantage is taken of such condition to obtain
from him a conveyance or contract which is unfair, made
upon inadequate consideration, or upon other, highly inadequate terms,, even though there may be no actual duress
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or threats, equity may relieve defensively or affirmatively.

Dittbrenner v. Myerson, 414 Colo. 448, 167 P.2d

15 (1946).

The principle upon which a court of equity

acts in relieving transactions on the ground of inequality of footing between the parties is not confined to
cases where fiduciary relationship is shown to exist, but
extends to all varieties of relationship in which dominion
may be exercised by one over another, and this principle
applies to er^€ty c^^evihere

influence is acquired and a-

bused or where confidence is reposed and betrayed.

Ditt-

brenner, Supra.
As Justice Frankfurter stated in U.S. v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp. 86 L.Ed. 855, 877:
n

Does any principle in our law have more
universal application than the doctrine that
Courts will not enforce transactions in which
the relative positions of the parties are such
that one has unconscionably taken advantage of
the necessities of the other? Fraud and physical duress are not the only grounds upon
which Courts refuse to enforce contracts. The
law is not so primitive that it sanctions every
injustice except brute force and downright fraud.
More specifically, the Courts generally refuse
to lend themselves to the enforcement of a bargain in which one party has unjustly taken advantage of the economic necessities of the other.
And there is great reason and justice in this
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rule, for necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free men, but, to answer a present exigency
will submit to any terms that the crafty may
impose upon them*11
No better opportunity has presented itself to a Court
to apply the principles above set forth than in the instant
case, where Defendants found Mr. Brady in a sick, exhausted and financially oppressed condition, and then took him
in, helped him, obtained his confidence, and led him to
believe they would buy his cattle and lease his land, and
finally, when no alternative was left to Mr. Brady, extracted from him a contract he would not otherwise have
signed.

CONCLUSION
Because of the lack of agreement about the lands
which were to be involved, the lack of consideration for
the option, and the inequitable manner in which Respondents
abused Mr. Brady's trust and confidence in the dire circumstances in which they found him, the Court should reverse the lower court and set aside the July 25th document entitled "Agreement to Sell Cattle and Lease Land
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With Option to Purchase", putting the parties back to the
position they were in prior to the execution of it.
Respectfully Submitted,
GAYLE F. MCKEACHNIE
TYRRELL R. SEAGER
Attorneys for Appellant
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